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Wal-Mart RFID fizzle?
by CHRIS KAPSAMBELIS, posted 02/25/2007
The big problem with passive EPC RFID is that it failed to perform any better than barcode. Wal-Mart based its vision on the perception that group reading (Pallet with cases) will eliminate the need for reading items one at a time. This was never possible because of Physics. When it comes to reading one at a time, barcode is superior.
In 2003 Wal-Mart was misled by the hype surrounding RFID in general, and failed to understand the limitations of the passive EPC RFID that was chosen for the Supply Chain. > > Gabrielle, > > I based it on the paragraph in the article where Langsford > says there are only 5 DC's implemented because they shifted > focus to the stores where there is a more immediate ROI. I > would have been more accurate to say "immediate ROI." > > It is hard to see where savings would come from though > since barcode systems are so efficient and RFID poses some > odd problems. Such as, what if a pallet of cases are > checked in, and there are 3 cases wide, by 3 cases deep, by > 3 cases high, but the RFID interrogator shows only 25 boxes? > It would seem that 2 tags aren't transmitting; but which 2? > How could you tell short of taking the pallet to the far > corner of the parking lot and bringing in one case at a > time until you got no reading on two of them. And how would > you correct the problem so that the cases can proceed > through the distribution channel? The tags are only 95% > effective, so this problem would present itself constantly > in a large DC. > > > > > Ken, > > I ask this question for a greater understanding on my > part. > > What information did you base your statement that no DC > ROI > > exists? > > > > Thanks in advance for your reply. > > > > > > > > > This article denies the Wall Street Journal's claims > > while > > > simultaneously confirming them. > > > > > > The fact is, Wal-Mart under Linda Dillman was clearly > > > mandating case-level RFID across the board. She told > MSN > > > Money Magazine that "they would not invest more time > in > > > suppliers that are reluctant..." > > > > > > The major CPG's co-opted the initiative to meet their > > ends > > > -- namely to insure store-level compliance with > > promotional > > > product in which they give Wal-Mart significant funds > > for > > > executing. No compliance -- no funds. The use of RFID > > for > > > promotions does benefit suppliers, consumers, and > > Wal-mart; > > > but it is not the vision Dillman had for the > technology. > > > > > > It also confirms that the ROI at the DC's isn't there > -- > > > which again was a major thrust of the initiative early > > on. > > > > > > > > > Finally, it confirms that using RFID to locate general > > > merchandise among a sea of boxes in the back room > > doesn't > > > work either. For example, cases in the box bailer > > waiting > > > to be recycled continue to transmit data when the > stock > > > room is interrogated. A bit of a problem with no > obvious > > > solution. > > > > > > RFID does make sense for tracking P-O-P compliance, > but > > > that will fail to generate the kind of impact that > > Wal-Mart > > > originally suggested by many orders of magnitude. > > > > > > RFID will be useful in retail and Wal-Mart blazed the > > > trail, but their initiative as originally conceived > has > > in > > > fact fizzled. Why not redefine the initiative honestly > > and > > > move on? > > > > > > Message threads
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